Fingerprint blocking can be detected

Brave version (brave://version info)

Tested in stable (83) and nightly

Description

Fingerprint blocking can be detected. 822 is related.

Problem

Lie detection makes way for trackers to decide whether or not to trust the fingerprint data.

Steps to Reproduce

1. check if brave is in navigator
2. [Nightly] webgl and 2d canvas data URI should not match after one is given style (or custom context): create webgl and 2d canvas contexts, add minimal style to each, and compare their data URIs
3. [83 Stable and Nightly] webgl renderer and vendor should not match string length: remove non digits or non a-zA-Z letters, then compare the string lengths of webgl renderer and vendor

Expected result:

1. If either context of webgl and 2d canvas is given a unique context, then the data URIs should not match when compared to each other. They currently do in Nightly strict fingerprint blocking. – possible solution: apply the randomization to the canvas context and not the dataURI
2. The vendor and renderer should not match in length, especially when non digits & non a-zA-Z letters are removed – possible solution: set vendor null for everyone in fingerprint allow and then apply subtle randomization to the renderer in standard and strict – randomization ideas: [a] include non digits, spaces, non a-zA-Z letters, and random length), [b] inject a random renderer consistent with the platform

Test Script

function isBrave() {
    if (!('brave' in navigator)) {
        return false
    }
    const compressLen = str => str && str.replace(/(\W|_)/g, '').length // compress vender and render length
    const canvas2d = document.createElement('canvas')
    const canvasWebgl = document.createElement('canvas')
    const context2d = canvas2d.getContext('2d')
    const contextWebgl = canvasWebgl.getContext('webgl')

    // get webgl vendor and renderer
    const renererInfo = contextWebgl.getExtension('WEBGL_debug_renderer_info')
    const vendor = renererInfo && contextWebgl.getParameter(renererInfo.UNMASKED_VENDOR_WEBGL)
    const renderer = renererInfo && contextWebgl.getParameter(renererInfo.UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL)

    // apply style to 2d canvas context
    context2d.fillText('RandomIronyValid&9', 100, 100)
    context2d.fillStyle = 'red'

    // apply style to webgl canvas context
    contextWebgl.clearColor(0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8)
    contextWebgl.clear(contextWebgl.COLOR_BUFFER_BIT)

    // get canvas data URIs
    const canvas2dDataURI = canvas2d.toDataURL()
    const canvasWebglDataURI = canvasWebgl.toDataURL()

    // detect lies and return
    const hasLiedVendorRenderer = (
        vendor == renderer || compressLen(vendor) == compressLen(renderer)
    )
    const hasLiedDataURI = canvas2dDataURI == canvasWebglDataURI
	
	// Both are true in Nightly strict fingerprint blocking
	// hasLiedVendorRenderer is true in 83 Stable strict and standard fingerprint blocking
    return {
        hasLiedDataURI,
        hasLiedVendorRenderer
    }
}

const brave = isBrave()
if (brave) {
    console.log(brave)
}

[pes10k]

Thanks @abrahamjuliot , i better understand your suggestion now, thank you for taking the time to explain. I think that, though, us trying to protect people who turn a privacy feature off is probably outside what we can reasonably take on. Making the 2d and 3d drawing operations randomized in the same way (which use very different code under the hood, since WebGL stuff can be shunted to graphics hardware, while 2d usually is not) would be a very large additional amount of work to maintain (especially since we have to keep repatching Blink, which makes keeping up to date with Chromium complicated enough already). And while that would be neat to do in the abstract, i think it just, unfortunately, falls on the wrong side of the cost-benefit trade off, given the large number of other critical privacy issues we need to tackle in the web platform.

But, all that being said, im grateful for the suggestion, and to have suggestions like yours for ways to keep improving the privacy protections we can provide. Thank you again for taking the time to make the suggestion, and I hope you’ll share other ideas you might have with us too!

[pes10k]

Hi @abrahamjuliot thank you for taking the time to file the issue! However, im not sure I understand the concern here. Its not a secret that Brave randomizes fingerprints (we mention it on our wiki and our blog for example). We also expect that, for some features, scripts can perform statistical attacks to recover the underlying values (in default mode, not strict mode), but would need to do things that look very different from benign API use.

The “Farbling Level: Default” section of the blog post gives exactly what the goals of the randomization are (in order):

1. Create a unique fingerprint, per session, per eTLD+1 for naive scripts (ie the ones that consume the randomized values)
2. Reduce the amount of identifying information available to more sophisticated scripts (ie those that update to not consume the randomized values)
3. If neither of the above are possible, make malicious use of these APIs look very different from benign use, to allow for future possible interventions

What we would be worried about though are any of the following:

1. If scripts could gain access to the consistent underlying values, and regain the ability to calculate consistent, identifying fingerprints of users again, in a way that was not easily distinguishable from benign use
2. That the randomization was being done in a way that it, itself, became a consistent tracking vector

So, I think this is not a bug, but please correct me if I’ve misunderstood @abrahamjuliot. And, in either event, thank you for taking the time to file the bug!