Please add some future-proof hostkey algorithm(s)
See original GitHub issueThis might become a more and more imminent issue in the not too distant future. With recent openssh-8.2p1 release there’s now the following release note:
Future deprecation notice
=========================
It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the
SHA-1 hash algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will
be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm that depends
on SHA-1 by default in a near-future release.
This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the
existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key
signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs.
The better alternatives include:
* The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These
algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as
"ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been
supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the
client and server support them.
* The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in
OpenSSH since release 6.5.
* The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These
have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7.
To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key
algorithm for host authentication, try to connect to it after
removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list:
ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host
If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key
types are available, the server software on that host should be
upgraded.
A future release of OpenSSH will enable UpdateHostKeys by default
to allow the client to automatically migrate to better algorithms.
Users may consider enabling this option manually.
[1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and
Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T
(2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf
So I tried to be proactive here and set this on all openssh servers I administer:
HostKeyAlgorithms ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
But none of these algorithms are known by ConnectBot. Please make at least one future proof algorithm available in ConnectBot.
Issue Analytics
- State:
- Created 4 years ago
- Reactions:1
- Comments:8 (1 by maintainers)
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Adding support for the new U2F/FIDO keys would also be great (ideally both through NFC and USB).
Note: This has a pending work-around in #1105, it just needs to be merged.