Disassemble regex in 930100

The regex in 930100 is rather hard to read. It would be worthwhile to disassemble it and then generate it via script:

(?i)(?:\x5c|(?:%(?:c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f|5c|9v)|1%(?:[19p]c|8s|af))|2(?:5(?:c(?:0%25af|1%259c)|2f|5c)|%46|f)|(?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8|e)0%80%a|bg%q)f|%3(?:2(?:%(?:%6|4)6|F)|5%%63)|u(?:221[56]|002f|EFC8|F025)|1u|5c)|0x(?:2f|5c)|/))(?:%(?:(?:f(?:(?:c%80|8)%8)?0%8|e)0%80%ae|2(?:(?:5(?:c0%25a|2))?e|%45)|u(?:(?:002|ff0)e|2024)|%32(?:%(?:%6|4)5|E)|c0(?:%[256aef]e|\.))|\.(?:%0[01]|\?)?|\?\.?|0x2e){2}(?:\x5c|(?:%(?:c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f|5c|9v)|1%(?:[19p]c|8s|af))|2(?:5(?:c(?:0%25af|1%259c)|2f|5c)|%46|f)|(?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8|e)0%80%a|bg%q)f|%3(?:2(?:%(?:%6|4)6|F)|5%%63)|u(?:221[56]|002f|EFC8|F025)|1u|5c)|0x(?:2f|5c)|/))

For the record: 930100 protects us from CVE-2021-41773, yet looking at the regex I can not readily see how.

[theseion]

##! These use the same techniques as for slashes to evade the detection of '.'
\.
\.%00
\.%01
\.\?
\?\.
\?
%2e
0x2e
%c0\.
%252e
%c0%2e
%c0%ae
%c0%5e
%c0%ee
%c0%fe
%uff0e
%%32%%65
%e0%80%ae
%25c0%25ae
%f0%80%80%ae
%f8%80%80%80%ae
%fc%80%80%80%80%ae
%2%45
%u002e
%uff0e
%u2024
%%32%45
%%32E
%c0%6e

[theseion]

##! source: https://github.com/wireghoul/dotdotpwn/blob/master/DotDotPwn/TraversalEngine.pm
##! attack description: https://doc.lagout.org/security/McGraw.Hill.HackNotes.Web.Security.Portable.Reference.eBook-DDU.pdf
##! Excerpt:
##! In short, IIS turns %c0%af into
##! the ASCII / character, but parses it at a point where security checks for
##! ‘../’ traversals have already occurred!
##! What has really happened? The attack uses an overlong Unicode
##! representation for a forward or backward slash (/ or \).
##! Unicode permits multibyte encoding of the same character.
##! The fundamental representation can be referred to as a one (character) to one (byte field)
##! representation. The overlong representation is a one (character) to many
##! (bytes) version.
##! Two more valid strings that represent the backward slash are %c1%1c
##! and %c1%9c. The difference between these two hex values is 128. More
##! valid slash representations boil down to a matter of math. For example,
##! %c0%9v works even though %9v isn’t a hexadecimal value. Try adding
##! the value for “9” (57) to “v” (118); if the result is greater than 127, then
##! subtract 128—hint, the final result should be 47.

##! URI encoded
%2f
%5c
##! hex encoded
0x2f
0x5c
##! double URI encoded
%252f
%255c
##! overlong Unicode sequences (target IIS)
%c0%2f
%c0%af
%c0%5c
%c1%9c
%c1%pc
%c0%9v
%c0%qf
%c1%8s
%c1%1c
%c1%af
%bg%qf
##! Unicode 16 "alternative" glyphs
%u2215
%u2216
##! unknown
%uEFC8
%uF025
##! more double encoding and variations on the above
%%32%%66
%%35%%63
%e0%80%af
%25c1%259c
%25c0%25af
%f0%80%80%af
%f8%80%80%80%af
%2%46
%%32%46
%%32F
%u002f
%1u
/