Mention how to seed PRNG before activating Filevault
See original GitHub issueFor example:
cat > /dev/random
[type random letters for a while and press ctrl-c]
Issue Analytics
- State:
- Created 7 years ago
- Comments:11
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In this issue I’m asking for a more practical advice for users that want to additionally seed the Yarrow PRNG by writing to /dev/random before activating FileVault. FileVault keys are generated from the PRNG and my estimate is that the entropy that went into the PRNG before that is rather low. We did experiments with 1000 fresh install boots and the estimated effective fresh reboot seed entropy is around 320 bits:
From those seeds, microtime and current time are predictable. SystemEntropyCache is empty. 7 of 8 bytes of mach_timespec_t is also predictable.
In most systems, SystemEntropyCache from the first boot saves the day so we didn’t go to DEFCON 😃 but it’s still pretty low entropy.
See https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/374.pdf for more info. This is based on 10.7. I would be interested in your comments on this assessment 😃
@felixgr , I’ve meant situation if the HD was encrypted after the 1st boot.